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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
difficult statutory evaluation rule, the Court has created a standard leading
to judicial waste and possible injustice, while a further recognition of the
discretionary power of the federal judges would allow for "judicial econ-
omy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants."
Guy Holdridge
AT7ORNEY DISQUALIFICATION AT THE GRAND JURY
The novel question of disqualifying an attorney for conflict of interest
at the grand jury stage of a prosecution has been addressed in three recent
cases, Pirillo v. Takiff, 1 In re Investigation Before the April 1975 Grand
Jury,2 and In re Gopman. 3 The courts expressed particular concern that
conflict-laden representation would obstruct the free flow of information
to the grand jury by encouraging a "stonewall" of silence. The reasoning
is that a "stonewall" might develop as a result of an attorney's simulta-
neously representing a number of grand jury witnesses and potential de-
fendants since the attorney's interest in defending one client prevents him
from counseling another client to testify freely or to seek immunity in
exchange for testimony. Thus a conspiracy of silence is created, particu-
larly when one attorney represents all of the witnesses called before the
grand jury. Non-disclosure is also encouraged when an attorney represents
an outside institutional body which has an interest in halting the investiga-
tion while he simultaneously represents a witness before the grand jury.4
1. 462 Pa. 511, 341 A. 2d 896 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
2. 403 F. Supp. 1176 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
3. 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976).
4. Although Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure precludes an
attorney from being present when his client testifies before the grand jury, a
witness may confer with his attorney before and after giving testimony. A common
practice is to allow the witness to leave the grand jury room and speak with his
attorney when he is unsure as to how to answer a question. In United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976), the court seemingly ratified this procedure
stating, "Respondent was also informed that if he desired he could have the
assistance of counsel but that counsel could not be inside the grand jury room. That
statement was plainly a correct recital of the law."
For circuit court approval of allowing witnesses to confer with their attorneys
outside the grand jury room see United States v. George, 444 F.2d 310 (6th Cir.
1971); United States v. Weinberg, 439 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1971); Perrone v. United
States, 416 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1969).
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The latter concern provided impetus for the disqualification ordered
in Pirillo. A dozen policemen called as witnesses and potential defendants
before a special grand jury investigating corruption in the Philadelphia
Police Department were represented by an attorney who had for some time
been employed by the Fraternal Order of Police, an organization that had
openly and vigorously opposed the investigation. The court disqualified
the attorney, reasoning that his outside interest for non-disclosure unduly
encouraged a refusal to testify among the witnesses he represented, there-
by blunting the grand jury's investigative function.5
An attorney's multiple representation of members of a union
prompted disqualification in In re Investigation. 6 Following a decision to
strike, pressmen working at the Washington Post inflicted extensive
damage on the newspaper pressroom. The twenty-one pressmen called
before the grand jury all were represented by one attorney who was hired
by the union's law firm. Nineteen claimed the fifth amendment privilege
when questioned about the events at the Post; the other two testified they
had seen nothing. Although the district court noted that there was a
conflict of interest problem in the union's paying the attorney's fees, 7 its
disqualification order was based squarely on the conflict created by multi-
ple representation of witnesses and the resultant obstruction of the grand
jury's investigative function.8 On appeal, the decision was vacated as
premature and remanded for the court to interview the witnesses more
thoroughly in order to provide a factual basis for the prosecution to apply
the more traditional remedy of selective grants of immunity. 9
In Gopman, three labor union officials called as witnesses before a
grand jury investigating breach of fiduciary duties by another union
official were represented by a union attorney. Although nominally not
Although the Supreme Court has held that a witness does not have a constitu-
tional right to an attorney before the grand jury, In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333
(1957), Leonard B. Boudin argues persuasively that in light of the extension of the
right to counsel in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a witness who is a de facto defendant should have the
right to have counsel with him before the grand jury. Boudin, The Federal Grand
Jury, 61 GEO. L.J. 1, 15-19 (1972). For the proposition that a witness should have
the right to an attorney at the grand jury see Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F. Supp. 673
(E.D. La. 1967), rev'd, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040
(1970).
5. 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
6. 403 F. Supp. 1176 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated, 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
7. Id. at 1179.
8. Id. at 1182.
9. 531 F.2d 600 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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targets of the investigation, the three witnesses were subject to criminal
penalties if they had improperly kept records sought by the grand jury. All
claimed the fifth amendment privilege and refused to produce the records.
Although it is unclear from the opinion precisely on what basis the
decision was reached, the court disqualified the attorney stating that "the
public interest in a properly functioning judicial system must beallowed to
prevail . ... 0
Courts are vested with the authority to disqualify attorneys," but the
exercise of that authority has constitutional implications' 2 most notably in
depriving a party of the counsel of his choice. The sixth amendment right
of counsel does not extend an unlimited right to attorney of choice. For
example, indigents who have an attorney appointed for them by the court
have a right to "competent counsel," not to the attorney of their particular
choosing.' 3 Additionally, in the interests of proceeding with trial, courts
have refused a defendant's belated request for change of counsel where the
defendant was deemed to have had sufficient opportunity to select a
lawyer to his liking.14 In the recent case of Faretta v. California, '" the
Supreme Court reversed a conviction because the defendant had not been
allowed to represent himself. This recognition by the court that an accused
is master of his own defense with the power to control decisions relevant
thereto might be argued as a basis for allowing a defendant more privilege
in selecting a particular attorney. However, the classic statement of the
limited right to counsel of preference is found in Powell v. Alabama, ' 6 in
10. 531 F.2d 262, 268 (5th.Cir. 1976).
11. Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957); Flaska v. Little River Marine
Constr. Co., 389 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 928 (1968). See 28
U.S.C. §§ 1654, 2071 (1970).
12. In addition to the sixth amendment right discussed in the text at notes 13-15,
infra, parties engaged in a cooperative defense, as in the instant cases, may have a
first amendment right to associate for the purpose of retainirig counsel. See United
Transp. Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); UMW v. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n., 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S.
i (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). For a positive statement of the
right to an attorney of choice see United States v. Liddy, 348 F. Supp. 198 (D.D.C.
1972).
13. United States ex rel. Reid v. Richmond, 197 F. Supp. 125, 126 (D.D.C.
1960), rev'd on other grounds, 295 F.2d 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 948
(1961).
14. E.g., United States ex rel. Carey v. Rundle, 409 F.2d 1210, 1214 (3d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 946 (1970).
15. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
16. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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which defendants were said to have only "a fair opportunity to use counsel
of choice." 17
In practice, despite these constitutional repercussions, disqualifica-
tion at all stages of criminal proceedings has been left largely to judicial
discretion.' 8 In United States v. Dinitz, 19 the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,
recently reaffirmed that the scope of review for a disqualification order is
limited to "abuse of discretion." 20 In that case, one of the defendant's
attorneys was disqualified for including remarks in his opening statement
that the trial judge repeatedly warned him not to make. The Fifth Circuit,
in upholding the disqualification, stated its policy clearly: "[Tihe Sixth
Amendment's right to choice of counsel merely informs judicial discre-
tion-it does not displace it. "21
When exercising that discretion, trial courts' disqualification orders
have largely reflected a concern for clients' rights and have been invoked
mainly 22 to protect the person being represented 23 or a prior client's
17. Id. at 53.
18. E.g., Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529 (1824); W.T. Grant Co. v.
Haines, 531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976); Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l. Corp., 469 F.2d
1382 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973). For a case where discretion
was held to be abused see Gas-A-Tron v. Union Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.
1976).
19. 538 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976).
20. Id. at 1224.
21. Id. at 1219. But cf. In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975) (court held
that for pro hac vice appearances, failure to admit an attorney must be based on a
complaint justifying disbarment).
22. Disqualifications have also been ordered to protect the integrity of the
judicial system. In a confusing line of cases, disqualifications have been based on
"nipping a conflict in the bud." Tucker v. Shaw, 378 F.2d 304, 307 (2d Cir. 1967).
See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hoffa, 242 F. Supp. 246, 257 (D.D.C.
1965). But cf. Yablonski v. UMWA 24945, 448 F.2d 1175, 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972) (court said it was proper for an attorney to
represent potentially conflicting interests for six months in order to "ascertain the
exact nature of the lawsuit and protect the interests of all defendants .. ").
Additionally, courts have ordered disqualification "to avoid even the appear-
ance of impropriety," Ernle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir.
1973). Canon 9 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility cautions, "A
lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety." Regarding
the increased use of Canon 9 to disqualify attorneys in the Federal Second Circuit
see Note, 25 CATH. U. L. REV. 343, 343-63 (1976).
On this matter a leading ethics scholar has noted, "Also, even where all parties
agree, the appearance of a lawyer on both sides of the same controversy, particular-
ly in cases of some notoriety, will often give an impression to the public which is
most unfortunate for the reputation of the bar, and which of itself should be
decisive .. " H. DRINKER. LEGAL ETHICS 105 (1953).
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confidences. 24 Trial courts have been alert to ensure that a defendant
receives representation that is not constitutionally deficient because of
conflicts of interest. 25 The right to a conflict-free attorney may be
waived,26 but only after the court has assured itself that the waiver was
made knowingly and intelligently.2 7 A thorough questioning of the defend-
ant may be in order in this regard, since the defendant might not be fully
aware of the effect his attorney's conflict has on the possibilities for a plea
bargain or a grant of immunity for his testimony. 28
Since the ability to foresee future events and the sense of decorum of judges
vary from court to court, disqualification on the two above discussed bases is not
subject to any easily discernible rules.
23. E.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
24. E.g., Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l. Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972).
Canon 4 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility says, "A lawyer should
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client." An attorney representing a party
opposing a former client, may find himself afoul of this provision. The degree of
involvement, with the prior client, the time that has lapsed since the representation,
the nature of the present action and other factors make the determination of a
violation of Canon 4 a controvertible issue.
25. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)("The right to have the
assistance of [undivided] counsel is too fundamental and absolute to indulge in nice
calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial.").
26. E.g., United States v. Swanson, 509 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1975).
27. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 394 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
28. See e.g., United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 273-74 (5th Cir. 1975). In
Pirilo, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896, 901-02 (1975), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
discussed the difficulties of waiving the right to conflict-free representation but
avoided ruling on whether a proper waiver was made. The D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, in remanding for further interviewing of the witnesses, in In re Investiga-
tion, 531 F.2d 600, 607 (D.D.C. 1976), questioned whether the witnesses had
actually waived their right to a conflict-free attorney.
Ethical Consideration 5-16 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility
says in part, "Thus before a lawyer may represent multiple clients he should fully
explain to each client the implications of the common representation and should
accept or continue employment only if the clients consent. If there are present other
circumstances that might cause any of the multiple clients to question the undivided
loyalty of the lawyer, he should also advise all of his clients of those circum-
stances."
Even if a client knows of the outside interest of his attorney, a full explanation
should not be lightly inferred as the subtleties of grants of immunity, contempt for
improperly invoking the fifth amendment, and other possible developments in the
criminal justice system are not easily understood by the layman. In United States v.
Liddy, 348 F. Supp. 198, 200 (D.D.C. 1972), the court noted that "In situations
where more than one defendant is represented by the same attorney, however, the
court cannot simply assume that such arrangement is in accord with the desire of
each defendant. Because one may accept dual or multiple representation without
comprehending that his interests conflict with those of his co-defendants or without
being aware of his right to demand individual representation, it is the court's duty to
satisfy itself that the choice is intelligently made and that conflicts are not likely."
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There does not appear to be much concern that conflict-laden repre-
sentation may obstruct either the truth-seeking function of the trial or the
prosecutor's role in developing his case against defendant. For example,
in United States v. Garcia, 29 where a number of policemen were charged
with corruption, the district court allowed a defendant to hire as counsel
the attorney who represented six other defendants at the trial and fifteen
unindicted policemen who had testified at the grand jury which had
indicted the defendant. The Fifth Circuit concluded that despite the con-
flicts of interest the defendant could waive his right to a conflict-free
attorney and remanded for a determination of whether an intelligent
waiver had been made. 30 Significantly, no mention was made of the effect
that the multiple representation had on the government's ability to marshal
the most truthful and convincing case against the defendant. 31
In contrast, in the three grand jury conflict of interest cases discussed
previously, 32 disqualification was not based on the protection of witness-
clients' rights. Rather, the public interest in the effective functioning of
the grand jury as an investigative body was the reason most emphasized to
justify the disqualification orders.33 This emphasis is not surprising since
29. 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975).
30. Id. at 273-74.
31. The problem of multiple representation has also arisen in the context of
administrative proceedings. In SEC v. Csapo, 533 F.2d 7 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the D.C.
Circuit rejected an S.E.C. disqualification of an attorney who represented a number
of witnesses called before the Commission in a probe of illegal insider trading. A
single firm represented four of the principal targets; in addition, other officers of
the corporation being investigated testified that they had been approached to hire
the same firm in order to present a "common front." Id. at 9-10. The court held
there was no "concrete evidence" that the investigative function of the hearing had
been obstructed, id. at 11, and that in any case "such [multiple] representation
may facilitate and expedite the proceedings." Id. at 11-12.
For an instance where an attorney disqualification was upheld based on con-
flict of interest disrupting the investigative function of an administrative hearing,
see Torras v. Stradley, 103 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ga. 1952) (attorney for taxpayer not
allowed to represent secretary-bookkeeper in the IRS probe of the taxpayer).
Contra, Backer v. CIR, 275 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1960). A distinguishing factor in
Torras is that the secretary was just a witness and not in as great need for a
particular attorney. The converse of this argument was used in SEC v. Higashi, 359
F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1966), to overturn an attorney disqualification where the client-
witness was a potential defendant.
32. Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1083 (1976); In re Investigation, 403 F. Supp. 1176 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated, 531 F.2d
600 (D.C. Cir. 1976); In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976).
33. In Pirillo v. Takiff, 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896, 905 (1975), the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania noted that the court supervising a grand jury "must be alert to
prevent as far as possible any abridgement of the body's function which is to
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courts have increasingly stressed the investigative function of the grand
jury over its historical role as a protection for the accused against unjust
prosecution. 34 For example, in United States v. Calandra, 35 the Supreme
Court noted that the grand jury served for centuries as a "protector of
citizens against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action," 36 but went
on to conclude that "[tihe grand jury's investigative power must be broad
if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged."
37
Determining whether the investigative function of a grand jury has
been subverted is not always an easy task. Courts should carefully analyze
the actual effect the representation of an outside institutional interest or
multiple representation of witnesses has on the grand jury. In Pirillo and
In Re Investigation the attorneys' outside interests clearly militated against
testimony by the grand jury witnesses. In Pirillo the Fraternal Order of
Police organization that paid the witnesses' attorney had openly stated its
opposition to the investigation. The attorney had personally been involved
in efforts to block the probe. In In re Investigation the union that hired the
witnesses' attorney faced a $15 million civil suit for the incident at the
Post. In these two situations, the lawyers were not free to advise a witness
to testify or to seek immunity, and since they represented all of the
witnesses before the grand jury, a "stonewall" was encouraged.
investigate public wrongs and bring indictments for the protection of society." At
trial in In re Investigation, 403 F. Supp. 1176, 1180 (D.D.C. 1975), the district court
concluded that "the public interest in the effective functioning of the grand jury
compels the conclusion that . . .[no] single attorney can continue to represent all
pressmen called as witnesses before the grand jury."
Although the basis of the opinion in In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 268 (5th Cir.
1976), is far from clear, the court did note that "the public interest in a properly
functioning judicial system must be allowed to prevail .... "
34. E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
Leonard B. Boudin complains that the grand jury's "traditional role ... as the
arbiter of government prosecution has been eroded by recent government practice
and Supreme Court decisions to a status as merely another weapon in the govern-
ment's fact-finding arsenal." Boudin, supra note 4.
Matthew Zwerling points out that it was the view of the grand jury as a
protector of individual liberties - brought home by the popular refusals of grand
juries to indict the Earl of Shaftesbury in England in 1681 and initially not to indict
Peter Zenger in America in 1735 - that led the founding fathers to enshrine the
grand jury in the fifth amendment. Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v. Attorney
Independence and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1263 (1976).
35. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
36. Id. at 343.
37. Id. at 344.
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In Gopman, 38 however, the outside interest of the union members
(and at least theoretically, of the union) was in favor of disclosure of its
record-keepers' activities. A chief purpose of the Landrum-Griffin Act 39
under which the investigation was brought is to give union members
access to the financial records of their union. In this case, then, the outside
interest of the witnesses' attorney did not subvert the investigative purpose
of the grand jury; rather, it encouraged disclosure. 40 If in fact the union
attorney's allegiance rests with union officers rather than members, then
there is no outside conflicting interest when he represents the officers
before the grand jury. Although not articulated by the majority, disqualifi-
cation in Gopman may be justified on the conflicts engendered by one
attorney's representing three key witnesses. Attorney Gopman could not
advise one of his clients to testify, even if innocent, if the testimony would
incriminate one of the other witnesses/potential defendants because the
other witness was also his client.
The district court in In re Investigation based its holding on the
problem of representation of multiple witnesses. The appellate court,
although vacating the order, noted its approval of the reasoning that
representation of several witnesses before a grand jury involves inherent
conflicts of interest. 4 Pirillo also noted this problem but studiously
avoided holding that representation of several witnesses before a grand
jury was per se a conflict of interest. The disqualification order nonethe-
less required each witness to be represented by a separate attorney.42
Prohibiting multiple representation at the grand jury is a harsh rem-
edy and disruptive of common practice. However, the logic of the subver-
sion of function argument leads to such a conclusion, particularly where
the witnesses sharing a common attorney are potential targets and there are
few other witnesses available to supply the needed information to the
grand jury.
Attorney disqualification to preserve the investigative function of the
grand jury should be invoked only in extreme circumstances. The failure
to analyze the actual effect of the conflict on the grand jury function as in
Gopman is to be avoided. The constitutionally related right to attorney of
38. 531 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1976).
39. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act)
29 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (1970).
40. See In re Gopman, 531 F.2d 262, 268-69 (5th Cir. 1976) (Clark, J., dis-
senting).
41. 531 F.2d 600, 603 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
42. 462 Pa. 511, 341 A.2d 896, 906 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1083 (1976).
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choice and the historical purpose of the grand jury as a shield and not an
unlimited prosecutorial tool should be weighed before disqualification is
ordered. A witness's apparent waiver of his right to a conflict-free attor-
ney, however, should be carefully scrutinized as the potential conflicts in
multiple representation in the context of criminal prosecutions are numer-
ous and sometimes subtle, making a knowing and intelligent waiver
difficult.
Robert Bruce Macmurdo
MATERIALITY UNDER THE ANTI-FRAUD PROVISIONS OF THE FEDERAL
SECURITIES ACTS: How MUCH DISCLOSURE?
A minority shareholder in an acquired corporation sought damages,
restitution, and other equitable relief under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and rules promulgated thereunder, alleging that the joint proxy
statement issued by the boards of directors of both corporations soliciting
approval of the acquisition was incomplete and misleading in that it
omitted certain material facts. ' The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment on the liability question. 2 The Court of Appeals
reversed in part, granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment under
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 and rule 14a-9,4
finding that certain facts omitted from the proxy statement were material
as a matter of law. 5 The Supreme Court granted writs 6 to review the
1. The plaintiff claimed violations of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78N(a) (1934) and rules 14a-3 and 14a-9, promulgated
thereunder, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, 240.14a-9 (1975). The basis of the rule 14a-3
claim was the averment that the statement did not disclose that the transfer of
certain stock to National (the acquiring corporation) had given National control of
TSC (the acquired corporation). The rule 14a-9 complaint alleged omission by TSC
and National of certain material facts relating to the degree of National's control
over TSC and the favorability of the terms of the proposal to the TSC shareholders.
96 S. Ct. 2126, 2129-30 (1976). The petition also claimed violation of rule lOb-5, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976). This claim was not before the Court.
2. 361 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. I11. 1973).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1934).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1976).
5. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., Inc., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975). The court
also affirmed the denial by the lower court of the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment on the rule 14a-3 question and the defendant Schmidt's cross-motion for
summary judgment on the l0b-5 question. No appeal was taken on these questions.
6. 423 U.S. 820 (1975).
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